This paper focuses on a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental quality, with two goods and factors, one clean and one dirty. Endogenous technological change creates either clean or dirty innovations, depending on relative profitability. The reduction of emissions intensity of aggregate output is achieved by changing the dirty-bias of technology in the economy. The decentralized equilibrium growth rate can be either below or above the optimal one. Distortions caused by the monopoly power and the R&D activity tend to decrease the decentralized equilibrium growth rate relative to the optimal one, while the environmental externality works in the opposite direction. We study both first and second-best policies.
Introduction
There is substantial agreement upon that climate is changing due to human activities. The last reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) make clear the urgency of the combat to climate change.
The solution for this serious problem implies a significant reduction of the current level of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). According to IPCC it is still possible achieve the strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to not more than 2 o C above pre-industrial levels, a rise which scientists say represents the limit of safety, beyond which catastrophic changes will occur. To meet this level, the last report of the IPCC indicates that the peak of global emissions will have to occur at about 2015, after which global emissions must go down substantially, between 50 and 85% in 2050 compared to 1990 (Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC [12] ).
International community is answering to this challenge through international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, under which the industrialized countries have compromised to reduce its emissions. However, it is urgent to speed up the reduction of the emissions and to reach more ambi- The reduction and stabilization of the GHG emissions demand a joint effort of governments, firms and individuals. There is need for deep changes in the way we produce and consume, towards a more rational use of energy.
New technology is critical on the response to climate change. It is important in determining the future GHG emission levels as well as feasibility and costs of emission reduction efforts. With the current technology and equipment, a reduction of emissions entails a fall in energy inputs, which is likely to lower output below its potential level. Thus, there is a trade-off between economic growth and environmental quality. In endogenous growth models, in order to avoid stagnation along the optimal path, the substitution of clean inputs for dirty ones either through increased abatement or technological progress is required, as shown in Bovenberg and Smulders [4] , Stokey [21] , Elbasha and Roe [7] , and Reis [18] , among others. Therefore, technological progress and the development of environmental friendly technologies will protect the environment and, at the same time, drive economic growth and increase the countries' competitiveness, lowering the conflict between economic growth and its negative environmental impacts.
In such a context, the adoption of a technology policy that stimulates R&D is very important. Moreover, technological change is responsive to environmental policy instruments, such as emission constraints, emission trading systems or taxes on emissions, which will induce the development and adoption on a large scale of new low-emission technologies and the increase of energy efficiency. 1 Studies that compare alternative policy instruments find that when comparing a policy with only R&D subsidies to an emission tax, the emissions-based policies performed substantially better (IPCC [12] ). This paper focuses on a two sector endogenous growth model with clean and dirty innovations, in an economy that cares about the environment. On the one hand, there is evidence that in a market economy research tends to be under-provided relative to the social optimum. 2 On the other hand, the extent to which research is environmental oriented and its policy implications are a matter of discussion.
The aim of the paper is to enhance the importance of technological change for lowering the environmental consequences of economic growth, such as the emissions of GHG. Technical change is crucial for economic growth, however to reconcile growth and environmental concerns, appropriate policies are required to stimulate adequate technological advance. In 1 Carraro and Siniscalco [5] present studies showing that large corporations typically adjust to environmental policy measures through innovation, rather than by switching inputs or reducing output. Moreover, they also mention the fact that without innovation very high taxes are required to curb down CO 2 emissions. 2 Jones and Williams [14] , [15] .
particular, we examine how environmental policy affects both the rate and the type of technological change. The question is not only "Are there limits to growth?" as in Stokey [21] , but also in what kind of innovations are we
interested in and what incentives should policy give.
Other papers have focused on the importance of endogenous research in market economies with environmental damages, like Elbasha and Roe [7] and Grimaud [9] . Our paper differs from theirs since we consider both clean and dirty innovations. More recently, Ricci [19] and Hart [10] , [11] , analyze, in a vintage model, the effects of environmental regulation on the quantity of research effort (how much research is performed), and on its quality (in an environmental dimension). We follow a different framework which focuses primarily on the relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies.
The structure of the modelled economy follows the work of Acemoglu [1] and Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] where innovations are carried out by profit maximizing firms. We assume two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. The polluting good is produced from the dirty factor and a range of dirty complementary intermediates. Pollution is a by-product of the dirty intensive good production. relative profitability. In particular, we focus our attention on the relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies, which will be the measure of the dirty-bias in the economy, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] . This feature of the model enables the analysis of the equilibrium versus the efficient dirty-bias in the economy in the presence of environmental externalities and the corresponding policy implications. Moreover, since energy efficiency increase is crucial on the response to environmental problems, we focus on the reduction of emissions per unit of output and not in absolute levels. 3 This approach will be followed, for example, by Canada. Government intends to implement a domestic trading system in which emission reduction credits can be traded to limit carbon emissions from much of the economy's energy and industrial sectors. The emission targets will be expressed in terms of a reduction in emission intensity targets rather than in absolute levels of emissions reductions. This approach has raised questions about the international tradability of Canadian emissions credits because they are different from other credits, such as European credits, which represent an absolute amount of emissions reduction (Amano and Sedjo [3] ).
The solutions for the laissez-faire economy, the social planner's problem and the regulated economy are considered, assuming three imperfections: monopoly power in the market for intermediates, surplus appropriability problem and pollution. We compare the decentralized equilibrium solution to the efficient one. The corresponding growth rates are, in general, different.
Unlike Acemoglu [1] , where the decentralized equilibrium growth rate is below the optimal one, in this case we may obtain that the equilibrium growth rate is too high or too low. Distortions caused by the monopoly power and the R&D activity tend to decrease the decentralized equilibrium growth rate relative to the optimal one, while the environmental externality works in the opposite way. This last effect is larger the more consumers value the environment. As well, emissions intensity of aggregate output is larger in the decentralized economy than in the optimal solution, as expected.
We identify the first-best regulatory instruments and show how relevant environmental concerns are to growth and to clean technical change, and, thus, how environmental policy influences the nature of technical change.
We show that the optimal policy encourages a change in the quality of research, in favor of the clean sector of the economy. According to our specification, it is possible to have the decentralized growth rate below the optimal rate, if the concern with the environmental externality is not too large. In this case, the optimal solution is characterized by boosting growth and decreasing the dirty-bias in the economy and, therefore, decreasing the emissions intensity of aggregate output. We also study a second best context, when there are multiple imperfections but insufficient policy instruments available to correct them.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The decentralized equilibrium is derived in Section 3. In Section 4, the solution to the social planner's problem is discussed and compared to the decentralized solution. Section 5 focuses on policy implications. Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions. Technical details are presented in the appendices.
The model
The economy is closed and produces an aggregate output from two commodities, which use primary factors of production and a set of differentiated intermediate inputs. The model builds in Acemoglu [1] and Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] , introducing preferences for environmental quality.
Consumers There are many identical infinitely lived consumers who get utility from consumption of aggregate output and environmental quality.
Utility of a representative consumer is given by
where C is consumption of the aggregate output, Q measures the quality of the environment, µ reflects environmental preferences and ρ is the rate of time preference. The utility function is increasing and strictly concave in C and Q as long as µ > 0. Also, we assume the representative consumer values the consumption more than the environmental quality, such that µ < 1.
Consumers are endowed with two primary factors of production: a clean (L) and a dirty (Z) factor of production. 4 Final output sector The aggregate output Y is produced from two goods, Y L and Y Z , through a Cobb-Douglas production function, as in Acemoglu
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to Y L .
Y L is intensive in the clean factor, L, while Y Z uses the dirty factor, Z, intensively. Y L and Y Z production functions are given by
4 We do not allow factor accumulation in order to simplify the analysis. 5 Our approach deviates from Acemoglu's approach [1] . We assume elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production (and between the two goods) equal to 1 and only focus on the relative physical productivity of dirty and clean factors and not on the corresponding relative factor rewards. Consequently, we focus on factor-augmenting technical change and not in factor-biased technical change. Moreover, we assume a constant relative supply of primary factors of production, in contrast to Acemoglu [1] . A possible extension of our work is to assume a general elasticity of substitution between the two factors. In such case, we can follow the work of Acemoglu more closely.
where β ∈ (0, 1), and L and Z are assumed to be supplied inelastically.
The L-intensive good is produced from the clean factor and a range of Lcomplementary (L-augmenting) intermediates (x L ). The range of intermediate inputs that can be used with factor L, and available at a given time period, is denoted by N L . The amount of input j used is denoted by x L (j).
The production function for the other good, Y Z , uses the dirty factor intensively and Z-complementary intermediates (x Z ). N Z and x Z (j) are similar. 6 The range of intermediates used in the production of the two goods, N L and N Z , may be different. A greater N L enables the production of a greater level of Y L for a given quantity of L, that is, it improves the productivity of the clean factor, while an increase in N Z improves the productivity of the dirty factor. The ratio (N Z /N L ) determines the relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies, which will be the measure of the dirty-bias in the economy, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] . For a given state of technology, that is, given N L and N Z , the production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. There will be aggregate increasing returns, when N L and N Z are 
where R L and R Z are spending on R&D for the clean and dirty factor- Budget constraint The budget constraint of the economy is
where I denotes investment, and R is total R&D expenditure. Consumption, investment and R&D expenditure are all the possible competing uses of the final good.
Environmental quality
We model the quality of the environment as a flow variable. Environmental damages are a by-product of the dirty sector.
Environmental quality is measured by the inverse of emissions 7
where emissions, E Z , are proportional to the production of Y Z . δ is a technology parameter that quantifies the detrimental effect of Y Z on the environment. Since energy efficiency increase is crucial on the response to environmental problems, we focus our attention on the reduction of emissions intensity,
Decentralized equilibrium
In this section, we determine the decentralized equilibrium without government intervention. Agents take the environmental quality as given.
7 See, for example, Elbasha and Roe [7] .
Given N L and N Z , an equilibrium is a path for prices and a path for quantities such that (i) consumers decide on consumption and asset accumulation taking prices, the interest rate and the environmental quality as exogenous functions of time; (ii) producers of Y L and Y Z choose quantities of the clean and dirty factors and corresponding complementary intermediates, We assume that all agents have perfect foresight, so that at each moment of time the entire path of prices is known.
The markets for Y L and Y Z are competitive, so market clearing implies that their relative price p is given by
The greater the supply of Y Z relative to Y L , the lower is its relative price p.
Let the price of the final good be the numéraire, the following relationship between the prices of the two goods holds
Firms in the clean sector solve the following maximization problem
taking the price of their product, p L , the price of the primary factor, ω L , From the first-order conditions of these problems, the rewards for the primary factors of production, ω L and ω Z , are obtained, as follows
and the demand for each intermediate input is given by
The demand for each intermediate input is the same for all j ∈ [0, N L ] and 
Since the demand curve for the intermediate input (11) is iso-elastic, profits are maximized by following the constant mark-up over marginal cost pricing
To simplify the algebra, we normalize the marginal cost to
Therefore, price, quantity and, hence, the level of profits are the same for all firms operating in each intermediate inputs sector. Using the prices and demands above, the profits of technology monopolists are
Profit maximizing firms will produce more innovations in response to greater profits. R&D firms develop new clean or new dirty complementary intermediates depending on relative profitability. What is relevant for the monopolists are not the instantaneous profits, but the net present discounted value of profits.
To maintain asset market equilibrium, the rate of return from holding equities (dividends plus changes in the value of the firms) must be equal to the rate of return on a one period loan, r, that is
where r is the interest rate, potentially time varying. These equations relate the present discounted value of future profits, V (the value of a firm in the intermediate inputs sector), to the flow of profits, π. TheV term takes care of the fact that future profits may be different from current profits, for example, because prices are changing.
We will mainly focus on the long-run balanced growth path of this economy, where prices and the interest rate are constant. Thus, theV terms are 0. Then, combining (13) and (14), yields
The greater V Z is relative to V L , the greater are the incentives to develop dirty factor complementary intermediates, N Z , rather than clean factor com-
there are greater incentives to invent technologies producing more expensive goods. 8 Firms in the R&D sector are allowed to freely enter into or exit from the sector. Thus, in equilibrium, the value of a firm in the intermediate inputs
is equivalent to the cost of a new variety (
We assume a balanced growth path (BGP), or steady-state equilibrium, where prices p L and p Z are constant, and N L and N Z , grow at the same and constant rate. In equilibrium, along a BGP, all variables grow at the same
generate growth, the number of new designs must be expanding over time.
This occurs if the spending on R&D is increasing. More spending means more ideas, sustaining growth in the model. In this case, the growth in ideas
Technology monopolists are willing to innovate in both sectors if the following condition holds
According to this condition, it is equally profitable to invest money to invent L and Z-complementary intermediate inputs, so that along the BGP, N L and N Z can both grow. After substitution of (15), it implies
This condition can be solved for the dirty-bias in the decentralized economy,
Substituting (11) into the production functions (3) we obtain the market productions of Y L and Y Z , given N L and N Z . Substituting these into (7) and solving for p = p Z /p L we get the relative price of the two goods as a function of the relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies (N Z /N L ), and of the relative factor supply, Z/L:
From (11) and (18), the relative demand of intermediate inputs as a
Substituting the relative price p, (18) , in (17), and
This equation defines the relative physical productivity of dirty and clean factors along the BGP, which is positively affected by the relative productivity of the R&D labs and the relative weight in the production of Y.
Substituting (20) in (19), we obtain the relative demand of intermediate
The solution to the consumer's problem is obtained by solving the following intertemporal maximization problem
where a denotes assets, and r is the interest rate. From the optimality conditions, we obtainĊ C = r − ρ. 9 Along a BGP, all variables grow at the same rate, g = r − ρ. The free-entry condition for the technology monopolists working to invent L-
L L = r, in the steady-state. Using this condition together with (8), (18) , to substitute for p L , we obtain the growth rate of the economy for a
The long-run growth rate of the economy, in terms of the parameters of the model and the endowments, is summarized in the following proposition. 10
Proposition 1
The long-run growth rate of the decentralized economy is given by
Proof. Combining (20) with (22), the result follows.
Consumer's utility depends on environmental quality, which is not taken into account by the producer of the polluting good. Thus, the correct price for the polluting good will have to be determined by a regulator that maxi- Finally, there is another distortion in the model that causes R&D to differ from its optimal level (from now on, it will be denoted by R&D distortion): the surplus appropriability problem or "consumer" surplus effect. 11 The 10 We now briefly analyze the stability properties of the model outside the BGP. The equilibrium condition for the relative profitability of innovations along the BGP is given by
it will only be undertaken R&D in dirty complementary (clean complementary) intermediates. Since the relative profitability of creating dirty complementary intermediates (15) and (18)), the system is stable.
11 See Jones [13] , Jones and Williams [15] , Romer [20] .
market values research according to the stream of profits that are earned from the new design. The inventor of the new design captures this monopolist profit. However, the potential gain to society from inventing the good is the whole "consumer" surplus, under the demand curve (11) , evaluated at the optimal allocation. Since the inventor of a new design captures only part of this surplus, there is underinvestment relative to what is socially optimal.
The profits that the market offers to potential innovators are substantial, however they are still far short of the total gain to society from innovations.
This gap between social and private returns suggests that large gains are still available from encouraging research. 12 We address these issues in the next section, by solving for the social planner's problem.
The social planner's problem
The social planner's problem for this economy can be stated as
12 Empirically, there is evidence that the market tends to provide too little research. Jones and Williams [14] present empirical evidence, using econometric estimates of returns to R&D, that socially optimal R&D investment is at least four times greater than actual spending (accounting for the current patent system and subsidies to research). This clearly suggests the existence of underinvestment in R&D. However, their approach does not identify which factors determine that result. Knowing them may have important policy implications. Jones and Williams [15] , using a calibrated model, and in the absence of taxes and subsidies, find that the decentralized economy typically underinvests in R&D relative to what is socially optimal and that the main force promoting underinvestment is the surplus appropriability problem.
Thus, the current value Hamiltonian for the social planner's problem is The first-order conditions for a maximum are given by
Also, the following transversality conditions must hold:
If we solve (30) and (31) for the demands of the intermediate inputs, and combine them with (32), (26), (27), (28) and (29), we obtain
The optimal demand for each input is the same for all j ∈ 
Equation (40) can be solved for the the optimal dirty-bias, (N Z /N L ) * . Also, it shows how this ratio is influenced by the cost of innovations and by the shadow price ot the two goods. The price of Y Z in the decentralized economy, p Z , is higher than its shadow price, r Z , which internalizes the environmental externality. Thus, in the decentralized equilibrium, innovation directed at Z-complementary intermediates is overvalued.
. Rearranging (27), and using the optimality conditions (28) and (29), the shadow price for Y Z can be written as
, where κ, which captures the pollution externality and is a constant along the BGP, is given by
Notice that the lower is κ, the larger the environmental externality. When there is no externality, as in Acemoglu [1] , κ is equal to 1. 14 Substituting (38) and (39) into the production functions (3), we obtain the optimal Y L and Y Z , given N L and N Z . Substituting these into the relative marginal product of Y Z , given by (7), and solving, we get, implicitly, the efficient marginal rate of transformation between the two goods, as a function of both relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies, (N Z /N L ), and the relative factor supply, (Z/L), as follows
From (38), (39) and (42), it follows that the relative demand of interme-
For a given state of technology, (N Z /N L ), the market economy relative demand of dirty complementary intermediates is higher than optimal (recall equation (19) ).
The efficient dirty-bias is sumarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 The efficient dirty-bias in the economy is
Since κ < 1, the efficient dirty-bias is smaller than the equilibrium one of the decentralized economy, given by (20) .
Proof. Substituting (42) and the above expressions for r L and r Z in With endogenous technology, the relative demand of intermediate inputs is the same as in the decentralized economy (see (21)). From (43) and (44) it follows that, in the market economy, the relative production of Y Z is larger than the efficient one, both for a given state of technology and with endogenous technology. Consequently, the emissions intensity of aggregate output is higher than optimal. The laissez-faire pollution is higher than optimal, as expected. by (7), we obtain, after some algebra, the growth rate of the economy, for a
The long-run growth rate (and also the optimal growth rate of innovation) of this economy is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
The optimal long-run growth rate of the economy is given
Proof. Combining (44) with (45), the result follows.
The environmental externality influences the growth rate through (i) the adjustment on the intermediate inputs, and (ii) the incentives to innovation.
The growth rate of the economy, given by (45), before incorporating the efficient dirty-bias, captures the externality through the adjustment on the intermediate inputs, for a given (N Z /N L ). However, the externality is only fully accounted for after incorporating the optimal dirty-bias of technology, as shown in (46).
The optimal growth rate, (46), corrects for both the environmental externality (through κ) and the monopoly and R&D distortions (through
While the environmental externality has a negative impact on the optimal growth rate (κ < 1), the monopoly and R&D distortions have a positive impact (
β > 1). The environmental externality contributes to reduce g * relative to g DE , while the monopoly and R&D distortions work in the opposite way.
If the correction for the monopoly and R&D distortions prevails, then g * > g DE . However, the optimal growth rate is lower than it would be without environmental externalities. In such case, when the environmental externality is not too large (large κ), the optimal solution is characterized by boosting growth and decreasing the dirty-bias in the economy. If the correction for the externality prevails, then g * < g DE . The decentralized growth rate will be larger than the optimal rate, the stronger the effects of the environmental externality on welfare (the smaller κ). Proposition 4 summarizes the result.
Proposition 4
The decentralized equilibrium growth rate, g DE , can be smaller or higher than the optimal growth rate, g * .
So far, we have solved the model without taking into account that κ is endogenously determined. In order to obtain κ, we must derive the consumption to output ratio, C Y , at the optimal solution. Notice that (41) can be rewritten as κ = 1 − 16 Substituting the consumption to output ratio in κ, we obtain
Let κ = {κ s } represent the set of solutions for this equation. 16 See Appendix A for details. We follow Di Maria and Smulders [6] , in a different context. Appendix A also shows that In the model the effects of the environmental externality are captured by µ. When consumers do not value environmental quality (µ = 0), from (47), it follows that κ is equal to 1. When environmental quality is as important to consumers' welfare as consumption (µ = 1), then κ is negative. The more consumers value the environment (higher µ), and, therefore, the larger the environmental externality, the lower κ, and the lower the optimal growth rate of the economy. is concave. Figure 1 illustrates the left hand side and the right hand side of equation (47), for a given µ, when 1 − γ 6 β.
is convex for κ <κ, and concave for κ >κ. 17 Figure 2 illustrates the left and right hand sides of equation (47), for a given µ, when 1 − γ > β.
In both cases, as µ increases, 1 − ϕ(κ) crosses the horizontal axis at a higher κ. 18 Also, when 1 − γ > β, the inflection point,κ, is increasing in µ.
Thus, the right hand side of equation (47) moves to the right.
There is a solution for equation (47) as long as ∃ κ : 1−ϕ(κ) > κ, that is,
We assume a positive optimal growth rate of the economy, g * > 0, that
17 The inflection point isκ = A very high environmental concern by consumers would mean either zero or negative growth. 19 As well, from the maximization of the utility function, it has to be the case that g * < Proof. Differentiating the optimal growth rate (46) with respect to the relevant parameter, the results follow. The same results apply to the decentralized growth rate.
The comparison of the share of the clean and dirty goods in the aggregate output in the decentralized equilibrium and in the optimum is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
In the long-run, the share of the clean good in the aggregate output in the decentralized equilibrium is lower than the optimal one, and the opposite occurs with the share of the dirty good in the aggregate output, that is, it is higher than optimal in the decentralized economy. Also, the more consumers value the environment (the higher µ), the higher the difference between the decentralized and the optimal shares just mentioned.
Proof. See Appendix E.
19 See Appendix C. 20 Also, we can show that the higher µ, the higher the consumption to output ratio, C/Y, and the lower the share of final good devoted to investment, I/Y, and to R&D expenditures, R/Y (see Appendix D).
Consequently, emissions per unit of output are higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the optimal solution. Moreover, the more consumers value the environment (higher µ), the lower the optimal emissions intensity of aggregate output, which is given by
and is constant along the BGP.
Summarizing, for a given (N Z /N L ), the efficient relative production of the polluting good, and, thus, the efficient level of emissions intensity, is attained by adjusting the production of intermediate inputs. The long-run growth rate of the economy can be manipulated by policy makers using conventional policies. The next section focuses on the policy implications determined by the fact that the decentralized growth path is different from the optimal one.
Policy implications
Since the decentralized equilibrium growth path is different from the optimal one, and the the dirty-bias in the decentralized economy is different from the efficient one, there is scope for government intervention. In this section we look for policy instruments that align both growth paths and allow for the efficient dirty-bias, thus, internalizing the environmental externality.
We begin by looking at first-best policies. There are three distortions in the decentralized economy: (i) the surplus appropriability problem tends to generate too little research, (ii) intermediate goods are produced by technology monopolists, producing less than optimal, and, finally, (iii) because of the environmental externality, production of Y Z is larger than optimal.
Three market failures require for three policy instruments: a technology policy instrument that takes the form of a subsidy to the R&D sector to encourage research, a subsidy to the producers of intermediate inputs to equate marginal costs to prices and neutralize the effect of monopoly pricing, and an environmental policy instrument on producers of Y Z to internalize pollution externalities. In this last case, we assume an emission tax on the polluting good, which operates by closing the gap between private and social costs of the polluting activity. It makes the polluting activity less attractive, providing incentives to reduce it. When optimally choosing the level of the policy instruments, the optimal allocation can be attained through a decentralized competitive market driven equilibrium.
We first assume that all these instruments are available to policy makers.
However, because there might be insufficient policy instruments available to correct the multiple imperfections, we also look at second-best solutions. If growth is the most important target, we only need one policy instrument to align the two growth paths. However, one single instrument may not be enough to attain the optimal share of emissions in the aggregate output.
First-best policies
In order to determine the optimal policies, we introduce the policy changes and compute the policy-ridden solution. The optimal level of the policy instruments is obtained by comparison with the social planner's solution.
Let us consider that the set of first-best instruments available are the following: (i) the government pays a proportional subsidy, φ * > 1, to the R&D sector for each new design, which is assumed to be the same for new L and Z-complementary intermediates. The subsidy to the R&D sector generates incentives to research, since it decreases the costs of a new variety
. This has impact on growth by increasinġ
(ii) the government pays a subsidy, s * , to each producer of intermediate inputs, which is assumed to be the same for technology monopolists producing x L and x Z , and, finally, since the purpose of the environmental policy is to discourage production of Y Z , (iii) a unit emission tax, τ * Z , is levied on the polluting sector. The optimal policy is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7
The social optimum can be implemented through (i) a subsidy to the R&D sector equal to φ * = 1/ψ, (ii) a subsidy to the producers of intermediate inputs equal to s * = β, and, (iii) a tax on emissions equal to
roof. Comparing the policy-ridden solution given by
with the social planner's solution (46), the results follow. κ s is the solution for equation (47) and
The optimal tax increases with µ and decreases with the elasticity of Y with respect to the polluting good.
The first-best policy, summarized in the previous proposition, implements not only the optimal growth rate of the economy, but also the optimal emissions intensity of aggregate output. In fact, τ * Z induces the efficient demand for intermediates (together with the subsidy paid to the technology monopolists), and it implements the efficient dirty-bias in the economy.
The tax decreases the demand of the dirty intermediates and, therefore, depresses the value of patents of new dirty complementary intermediates.
This will encourage research towards new clean complementary intermediates, therefore, increasing the clean-bias in the economy. We obtain the optimal production of Y Z , when compared to the production of Y L , both for a given state of technology, and with endogenous technology. Therefore, the optimal level of emissions per unit of output is achieved.
Second-best policies
Because policy makers may not have all the instruments available simultaneously, we also specify a second best optimum, where the social planner has available only one policy instrument. We assume that the primary target of the policy-maker is to align the market and the optimal growth paths, as long as the emissions intensity of aggregate output decreases, or, it is at the most as in the decentralized economy.
In this case, we consider a tax on the polluting good and two different kinds of subsidies to R&D. We compute the policy-ridden growth rate, then equate it to the optimal growth rate and solve for the optimal level of the policy variable.
(1) Tax on the polluting good If the pollution externality prevails over the remaining distortions in the model (that is, κ is small) and the regulator wants to decrease growth (g DE > g * ), a per unit emission tax, τ Z , on the polluting sector can be considered. The growth rate of the regulated economy equates to the optimal one when
Although the growth rate for the economy is optimal, the emissions intensity of aggregate output is not. The tax moves the economy towards the optimum, by adjusting (i) the relative demand of intermediates, for a given state of technology, (ii) the dirty-bias (N Z /N L ). However, since this second-best tax is smaller than the first-best one, it achieves neither the efficient demand of intermediates nor the efficient dirty-bias. There is a decrease on the relative production of Y Z , and, thus, a decrease on the emissions per unit of output when compared to the laissez-faire economy.
However, it remains above the efficient level.
(2) Subsidy to R&D (i) If we assume a technology policy that takes the form of a common subsidy to both R&D sectors, that is, the same subsidy for new L and Z-complementary intermediates (φ = φ Z = φ L ), the optimal growth rate of the economy can be implemented through
This policy instrument can be used when the monopoly and R&D distortions prevail over the environmental externality (that is, κ is large) and the regulator wants to boost growth (g DE < g * ). However, since the intro- (ii) In contrast to the previous case, the government's technology policy may distinguish between the new designs by paying a different subsidy to each one, that is, φ Z 6 = φ L . In order to achieve g * , by computing the growth rate of the regulated economy, the following relationship between φ Z and φ L must hold:
Also, if
holds, the efficient dirty-bias is implemented. Solving this system of equations ( (50) and (51)), we obtain φ Z = ³ 1 ψ´1
for which both the optimal growth rate of the economy and the efficient dirty-bias in the economy are obtained. Since for technical change, the relative demand of dirty complementary intermediates is higher than the optimal one. Therefore, although this instrument implements the efficient dirty-bias, the production of Y Z is higher than the efficient one, and, consequently, the emissions intensity also is. However, the economy moves towards the optimum and attains a lower share of emissions in the aggregate output than in the decentralized equilibrium.
Differentiating R&D subsidies towards the clean sector corrects for the technology externalities and at the same time reduces emissions. However, using this instrument to achieve the emission reduction entails a welfare loss as R&D subsidies are a first-best instrument to internalize technology externalities but a second-best instrument to reduce emissions.
In the absence of this policy instrument both growth and environment are under-provided in the market economy. It leads to both an increase in the growth rate of production and to an improvement in environmental quality. This result can be interpreted in the line of Porter's arguments for growth enhancing effects of environmental regulation. Hence, in this case, a kind of Porter-like result emerges (Porter and Van der Linde [16] ). não sei se devo manter a frase pois istoé technology policy e não environmental policy???
In summary, despite that the optimal growth rate can be achieved using all these second-best instruments, only the tax on emissions, τ Z > 0, or the subsidies to research, (φ Z ) s < (φ L ) s , will decrease the emissions per unit of output when compared to the decentralized economy, in the long-run. A common subsidy to both types of research keeps the same emissions intensity as in the laissez-faire economy.
Conclusions
In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model for a closed economy, that incorporates the welfare effects of environmental quality and innova- We study the trade-off between environmental quality and growth. As expected, long-run growth decreases with the environmental externality.
The more consumers value the environment, the lower the optimal growth rate. This suggests that different concerns about the environment can help explain the differences in environmental policies, and, thus, in growth rates across countries.
Because there is a negative externality from pollution and distortions caused by the monopoly power and the R&D activity, the decentralized growth rate can be higher or smaller than the optimal rate. Eventually, the two growth rates are equal, if the opposing forces offset each other. Since it is also possible to have the decentralized growth rate below the optimal one when the environmental externality is not too large, the optimal solution implies boosting growth and decreasing the dirty-bias in the economy.
We study the problem of implementing the optimal path chosen by the social planner. There are three distortions in the decentralized economy: the surplus appropriability problem, the monopoly power by intermediate inputs producers and pollution. Since our goal is to implement the optimal path, three market failures require for three policy instruments. The first-best policy is implemented through a subsidy to the R&D sector to encourage research, a subsidy to the producers of intermediate inputs to neutralize the effect of monopoly pricing, and an emissions tax on the polluting good, to eliminate the distortion due to pollution. We compute the levels of the three policy instruments which allow implementing the optimal solution.
The regulator wishes to decrease the relative production of dirty inter- In summary, it is very important the adoption of a technology policy that stimulates R&D to address environmental problems. However, it must be complemented with environmental policy to stimulate adequate technological change. The environmental policy instruments encourage research of new clean factor-complementary intermediates and allow the regulated economy to choose the efficient dirty-bias. Pigouvian taxes change research incentives by increasing its environmentally friendliness, which is socially desirable. Thus, the optimal policy encourages a change in the quality of research, in favor of the clean sector of the economy. With first-best policies, the optimal level of emissions per unit of output is implemented.
We also discuss second-best policies, assuming that the primary target of the policy makers is to align the market and the optimal growth paths. However, only a tax on emissions, or a differentiated subsidy to R&D, according to the type of research, decrease the share of emissions in the aggregate output, when compared to the decentralized economy. However, although the economy moves towards the optimum, the optimal emissions intensity of aggregate output is not achieved. The total cost of producing L and Z-complementary intermediates is
where ψ is the unitary cost of production in terms of the final good, and x * i (j) N i is the total amount of intermediates purchased (i = L, Z). Substituting (38) and (39) into the production functions (3), and solving for the total amount of intermediates pur-
. Together with (26) and (27), we obtain
, the share of final good invested in intermediate inputs is given by
From (4), R&D expenditures in each sector can be written as 
can be obtained similarly. Summing up over both sectors, the total expenditure in R&D can be written as R =
The share of final good devoted to R&D expenditures is
Finally, from (5), we obtain the consumption to output ratio as
after substituting for g * , given by (46). (ii)
, that is, βρ−(g * +ρ)+µ[(1−β)(g * +ρ)+βg * ] g * +ρ < 0. Since g * + ρ > 0, the numerator must be negative. After some algebra, it can be rewritten as βρ − (g * + ρ) < 0. Since β ∈ (0, 1), βρ < ρ holds. Thus, βρ < g * + ρ also holds because g * > 0. 
Appendix E -Proof (Proposition 6)
Notice that the share of the clean good in the final output is given by the inverse of
, that is, from (7), by
After substituting for the efficient marginal rate of transformation between the two goods, with endogenous technical change (equation (42) 
